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ABSTRACT
The International Space Station (ISS) United States
Orbital Segment (USOS) Oxygen Generation System
(OGS) was originally intended to be installed in ISS
Node 3. The OGS rack delivery was accelerated, and it
was launched to ISS in July of 2006 and installed in the
US Laboratory Module. Various modification kits were
installed to provide its interfaces, and the OGS was first
activated in July of 2007 for 15 hours, rq October of
2007 it was again activated for 76 hours with varied
production rates and day/night cycling. Operational time
in each instance was limited by the quantity of feedwater
in a Payload Water Reservoir (PWR) bag. Feedwater
will be provided by PWR bag until the USOS Water
Recovery System (WRS) is delivered to SS in fall of
2008. This paper will discuss operating experience and
characteristics of the OGS, as well as operational issues
and their resolution.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. regenerative Environmenta Control and Life
Support Systems (ECLSS) have been developed to
enable the ISS to expand its crew size from three to six
crewmembers. These regenerative systems include the
Water Recovery System (WRS) and the OGS. The
OGS includes the Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA),
the Power Supply Module (PSM) that supports the OGA,
and scars to accommodate the later addition of a
Sabatier Carbon Dioxide Reduction Assembly (CRA).
Earlier development activities are summarized in
references 1-7.
shown in Figure 2. Feed water from the potable water
bus enters the assembly through the Water Orbital
Replacement Unit (ORU) and flows through an Inlet
Deionizing Bed, which serves as an iodine remover as
well as a coalescer for any gas bubbles that may be
present in the feed water. If gas bubbles are detected
by the gas sensor downstream of the DI bed, the feed
water is rejected to the waste water bus. This serves to
prevent any oxygen that may be present in the feed
water from mixing with generated hydrogen. Water is
electrolyzed into oxygen and hydrogen in the Hydrogen
ORU, which contains the electrolysis cell stack. Oxygen
produced by the cell stack passes through the Oxygen
Outlet ORU containing a water absorber, which protects
the downstream hydrogen sensors from liquid moisture.
The Hydrogen Sensor ORU monitors the product oxygen
for the presence of hydrogen, which would indicate a
problem with the Cell stack and signal the controller to
shut down the OGA. The Rotary Separator Accumulator
(RSA) within the H20RU separates the product gaseous
hydrogen from the water which is re-circulated by the
Pump ORU. The Nitrogen Purge ORU serves to purge
system lines upon shutdown with nitrogen, and the
Process Controller ORU is responsible for OGA System
command/control and communication with the ISS
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer (MDM).
OXYGEN GENERATION SYSTEM
OGA OVERVIEW - A simplified schematic of the OGA is
shown in Figure 1 and its installation in the OGS rack is
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Figure 1. OGA Simplified Schematic
Figure 2. Oxygen Generation System
The OGA is designed to generate oxygen at a maximum
nominal rate of 5.4 kg/day (12 Ib/day) when operated on
day/night orbital cycles, and also at a selectable rate
between 2.3 and 9.2 kg/day (5.1 and 20.4 Ib/day) when
operated continuously. At the nomina rate, the OGA
can support oxygen needs for 4 crew, biological
specimens, and atmosphere leakage, while at the
maximum rate it can support 7 crew, biological
specimens, and atmosphere leakage. The assembly
consumes 3573 W when processing, and 382 W during
standby. The product oxygen meets quality
specifications for temperature, free water, dewpoint, and
hydrogen content.
POWER SUPPLY MODULE OVERVIEW - The PSM is
shown in the lower left of the OGS rack in Figure 2. The
PSM provides 10-55 amps current to the OGA cell stack
during Process mode and 1.0+/-0.2 amps during
Standby mode, with a minimum efficiency of 91% in
Process mode. The PSM is designed for 60,000
process/standby cycles, and a lO-year life.
ON-ORBIT OPERATION
The OGS has been activated three times since its
installation in the ISS. In the first activation, the OGS
operated in Standby (~2% of maximum oxygen
production) for 6.8 hours and in Process (25% to 100%
of maximum oxygen production) for 15.8 hours, which
converts to approximately 13.4 Equivalent Full Power
Hours (EFPH). During the second activation the OGS
operated in Standby for 26.5 hours and in Process for
47.1 hours which convert to approximately 31 EFPH.
The third activation production parameters have not yet
been quantified, but the OGS operated between 25%
and 100% production rates, n both cyclic and
continuous modes for approximately 112 hours. The
following sections describe the activations in more detail.
FIRST ACTIVATION, ON-ORBIT DAY 2007:192 (JULY
11) - When the first activation of the Oxygen Generation
System (OGS) was attempted on July 11, 2007 it was
understood that there could be some problems with
startup. The system had been dormant--apart from
powering the controller, the recirculation pump, and
some valves--since December 2005. It was known that
the water in the hydrogen side of the cell stack would
permeate to the oxygen side, and the nitrogen in the
oxygen side would permeate to the hydrogen side. As a
result, the RSA would be low n water and would likely
cause a shutdown. Also, since water permeates to the
oxygen side of the stack, this water would then be
pushed into the hydrogen dome during the initial
nitrogen purge of the cell stack, which would extend the
needed time todry out the dome.
In light of this information, it is not surprising that there
were 11 fast shutdowns caused by system conoitions
during the attempted startup of the OGS. Fault limit
overrides were mplemented to overcome many of the
difficulties of starting the system. The timeline for the
first activation is shown in Figure 3.
Before the OGS can start, the hydrogen dome must be
evacuated and dried of any water. The dome must be
dry to allow for leakage detection, and enough time must
be given to evacuate the dome to vacuum to evaporate
any resident water so that the dome pressure will not
rise above the pressure trip-point after the evacuation
procedure is complete. Not enough time was allowed for
this evacuation procedure in the software, so high
hydrogen dome pressure caused the first two fast
shutdowns. As mentioned above, these shutdowns
were caused by the fact that the system was dormant for
so long that water accumulated in the oxygen side of the
cell stack, which was then purged into the hydrogen
dome.Thefirststartupattemptsdriedthedomeenough
sothat,bythethirdattempt,thedomehaddriedenough
soanotherhighdomepressurefailurewasavoided.
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Figure 3:1 stActivation Timeline
A low RSA volume caused the third fast shutdown. This
was expected to be a problem due to water crossover in
the cell stack, so overrides were prepared for the RSA
trip point and speed so that the system could continue
with the startup procedure and eventually fill the RSA
with water.
High water flow rate in the OGS water recirculation loop
appeared to be the cause of the fourth and fifth
shutdowns. However, it is speculatedthat it was not, in
fact a high flow rate that caused the shutdown, but an
anomaly with the Venturi used to measure the flow rate.
Since the RSA speed was increased after the third
shutdown to remedy the low RSA water condition, it was
speculated that the extra speed in the RSA caused an
ncrease in water flow. However, a similar condition was
observed n ground testing, and was attributed to gas
bubbles in the Venturi pressure taps causing errors in
the readings. The solution implemented in the ground
tests was to push high flows of water through the Venturi
to purge the bubbles. This solution worked, and so the
bubble theory was accepted. In order to continue
beyond this failure, the shutdown trip-point was
overridden to a higher flow rate Higher recirculation
flow rates were used during on-ground system testing,
and there is no safety limit restricting the upper limit of
the recirculation flow, so this override was not
considered a problem. Later in the startup procedure, it
was found that this initial high reading from the Venturi
decreased back to expected Fevels.
After the fifth shutdown, Standby mode was achieved
with RSA quantity nominal at over 328 ml. After
commanded Shutdown, the overrides for the RSA were
removed. The community may have thought that a
water fill had been initiated during the startup, making
these overrides unnecessary. However, the next startup
attempt, number six, showed that the RSA was still too
low and caused the sixth shutdown as a result. The low
RSA quantity overrides were reinstated for the next
startup attempt.
Even though the RSA water level software limits had
been overridden low for the seventh startup, hardware
shutdown limits exist that measured the water level
readings and prevented the recirculation pump from
starting. Software fault limits exist for the delta pressure
over the pump, and the pump speed, which tripped the
seventh shutdown. Previous startups had avoided this
fault by increasing the RSA speed, which increased the
delta pressure reading in the RSA. The higher pressure
met the hardware Limit requirements. Once the RSA
speed was no longer overridden high, the delta pressure
reading in the RSA was no longer high enough for the
hardware shutdown limits. The higher RSA speed
override was implemented for the next startup attempt.
The eighth startup attempt was not only able to reach
Standby operation, where a small amount of power is
supplied to the cell stack, but was also able to reach an
oxygen production rate of 25%. However, when an
attempt was made to remove the RSA speed override
while the system was running, the system shut down
due to the change in system operation caused by the
removed override. For the next activation attempt, the
speed override was not added to the override list.
Since operation of the cell stack was reached in the
eighth startup, more water was consumed by the
system, and hydrogen gas was now in the hydrogen side
of the cell stack. Also, the system did not initiate a water
fill, because at low production rates, less water is
required by software to be in the RSA. As a result, at
the ninth startup, the low RSA level was lowered even
more when the recirculation pump started and pushed
hydrogen gas from the cell stack into the RSA. This
caused another fast shutdown, requiring the previously
removed RSA overrides--the speed and quantity
overrides to be reinstated for the next startup attempt.
After the tenth startup, the system finally initiated a water
fill. However, there was still a speed override on the
RSA, which forced the RSA to run at a specific rotational
speed. Because there was a water fill, there was more
torquerequiredto maintainthatspeed. Unfortunately,
the RSAmotorcurrentreacheda hardwareimit and
preventedthe RSAfrom reachingthe requiredspeed,
whichwasnoticedby software(a tolerancefault)and
causedthe tenthshutdown.An attemptwasmadeto
startthe systemagainwithoutchange,but the same
shutdownoccurred.
Activationwas finallysuccessfulwitha complexset of
overridesand a processto graduallyremovethese
overridesafter activationwas achieved. Afterthe 11
shutdowns,thesystemranwellandwasableto runat
25%, 50%,75%, and 100%production. Oncethe
systemreached100%,it wasrunat thatlevelforseveral
hoursuntilthewatersupplywasexhausted.
SECONDACTIVATION,ON-ORBITDAY 2007:275
(OCTOBER4) - Muchwas learnedduringthe first
activationof theOGSwhichwasappliedto thesecond
activation The activationprocedurewas modifiedto
include several fault limit overrides that were
implementeduringthefirstactivation.A longerperiod
of timewasallowedto evacuatethe domeso thatany
water in the dome would have plenty of time to
evaporate.Themaximumrecirculationloopflowratetrip
pointwas increased.The low RSAwater leveJlimits
weredecreasedandtheRSAspeedcommandwaskept
withinitscapability.Asa result,thesystemwasbrought
upto poweron thefirststartupattemptandwasableto
completea full day of 50% day/nightcycling, The
timelineforthesecondactivationisshowninFigure4.
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To simulate a loss of power, Stop was commanded to
immediately remove power from all effectors while at
50% production rate. When a restart was attempted, an
RSA high level shutdown was tripped when the system
was commanded to Standby operation. This occurred
because when the system powers the cell stack,
hydrogen production pushes a fair amount of water into
the RSA. In previous startups, this failure was close to
being tripped, but never caused a shutdown. A second
attempt to start the system was made with no changes,
but the same failure occurred. Therefore, the maximum
RSA water level limit was temporarily increased in the
software to accommodate this condition.
The system was started again with no problems, and
proceeded to 25% production for about 2 hours. Next
the system was set at day/night cycling at 100%
production for about 10 hours to demonstrate it's
functionality at that power level. It was then switched to
100% continuous production for another 8 hours.
Next, the system was commanded to standby since a
long Loss Of Signal (LOS) period was imminent, and it
was known that the system had nearly exhausted its
external water supply. It is desirable to shut the system
down manually before the external water supply is
completely exhausted to prevent the RSA water level
from being low for the next startup. After about 2 hours
of standby operation, the LOS passed and the system
was powered to 100% continuous production with no
problems. This power level was maintained until the
system consumed all of its available water.
THIRD ACTIVATION, ON-ORBIT DAY 2008:058
(FEBRUARY 27) At this time there was a
comprehensive set of overrides in a procedure,
including two additiona RSA high-quantity overrides
identified in Activation #2. We had, however, reduced
the RSA override commanded speed due to its inability
to reach the speed commanded. Added to this was the
potential increased loss of RSA quantity due to cell stack
diffusion into the evacuated dome for 144 days since
Activation #2. See the timeline for faults in Figure 5:
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Figure 5:3 rd Activation Timeline
After fault #1 and #2, before which the RSA interlock
with the pump did not set, the RSA speed was increased
to the level which had previously provided a successful
startup. This allowed the startup to progress further, but
also resulted in fault #3 as the RSA differential pressure
slowly decreased. A successful startup was enabled by
a complex set of overrides with the goal of providing cell
stack current and an RSA fil as soon in the startup
process as possible. This was done by disabling as
many built-in tests as possible and commanding Process
at 25% rate instead of Standby. After an RSA fill,
Shutdown was commanded to re-enable built-in tests.
Standby was commanded with the procedural overrides
as officially documented.
GENERAL DISCUSSION OF STARTUP FAILURES
The faults encountered during startup attempts are of
five classifications.
1. High dome pressure
2. Pump speed-The recirculation pump is not
running when it should.
3. High recirculation flow differentia] pressure-
Bubbles in the recirculation loop are blocking the
flow sensor.
4. High or low RSA quantities
5. Tolerance faults
HIGH HYDROGEN ORU DOME PRESSURE - The first
two faults in Activation #1 were because the dome
pressure did not reduce to below shutdown limits after a
startup nitrogen purge. This was considered to be
because of liquid that still existed in the dome. The
problem did not occur after, but a permanent override
extending the dome venting after a startup purge was
implemented, since there was determined to be no
innpact to Safety.
RSA DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE INTERLOCK WITH
THE RECIRCULATION PUMP - If the differential
pressure across the RSA at sensor 7331-3 cannot
exceed 64.65 mmHg (reset limit) or drops below 56.89
mmHg, a hardware interlock prevents the recirculation
pump from being powered. This is to prevent gas from
entering the recirculation loop and being a source of
combustion. Figure 6 shows a startup sequence from
Activation 1, which did not reset the interlock (pump
never turned). The initial part of the chart shows RSA
operation at a lower speed to evolve dissolved gas.
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Figure 6: RSA Differential Pressure Sensors, 2007 Day
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Figure 7: RSA Differential Pressure Sensors. 2008 Day
059, GMT 2:58
It's evident that the pressure reading of the two RSA
differential pressure sensors 7331-1 (software only, and
the quantity control sensor) and 7331-3 (hardware
interlock) are not consistent. On occas=on as shown in
Figure 7, 7331-3 is as much as 5 mmHg below 7331-1.
The pump interlock function of 7331-3 cannot be
inhibited or modified. The 7331-3 interlock does not
result in a software fault by itself, but related software
faults will result if the pump does not come up to speed
within 15 (default) seconds. The first three activations
have been achieved by overriding the RSA speed from
default of 1500 RPM to 1783 RPM. This increases the
differentialpressureby centrifugalforce towardthe
outsideof the RSA. The value is reducedafter
successfulactivationtoreducewearontheRSA.
Foractivation#3, it wasalso necessaryto accelerate
cell currentand RSA fil by inhibitingbuilt-intests.
Figure 7 illustrateshow this assists in successful
activationbeforethe7331-3interlockcanbetripped.
HIGH REClRCULATIONFLOW DIFFERENTIAL
PRESSUREFAULT- Activation#1Faults4 and5were
dueto highdifferentialpressureacrosstheflowsensor
venturiFL 7531 1. Previousto thesefaults,the RSA
quantityreadinghaddippedto98ml. Sincethisvalueis
filtered,theactualvaluemayhavebeenlower. Thisis
evidencethatgasactuallydidentertherecirculationloop
duringourattempto restartwithlowRSAquantity.The
gascleareditselfaftera subsequentattempt(fault5).
HIGH OR LOW RSA QUANTITIES- There are
problemswiththereferencevaluesof the RSAleakage
detection.Thesefaultsprotectagainstleakageintothe
recirculationloopfromprocesscoolant,or leakageoutof
the recirculationloop into the rack. The minimum
referencevalueforthe lowlevelfaultis327.74ml. If the
measuredRSAquantityis morethan98.3mlbelowthis
value,a lowquantityfaultwilloccur.Anothereference
valuefor the highfault is setat the lowestactualRSA
quantity,andthefaultwilloccurif thequantityincreases
by 163.9mlwhenthesystemis notinafill mode.If the
lowestvalueis 200ml,thefaultwill occurat 363.9ml.
Thelimitsmustbe expandedfor successfulactivation,
and then resetto performtheir safetyfunctionduring
OGSoperation.
TOLERANCEFAULTS- DuringActivation#1, theRSA
speedwasoverriddento a fasterspeedthanitwasable
tosupport.Thisresultedinatolerancefaultbetweenthe
RSAcommandedandactualspeed.Thedefaultlimitis
54RPM.Anothertolerancefaultwasencounteredwhen
the speed'was reducedand the softwaredid not
anticipatea delayto reachthecommandedspeed.The
toleranceis increasedto 200 RPM,and returnedto
defaultaftersuccessfulactivation.
FAULTSUMMARY- The RSA7331-3interlockcanbe
"fooled"into allowingstartupby increasingthe RSA
rotationaspeed.Thisis at theriskof allowinggasinto
the recirculationloop if the level is too low. The
remainingsoftwarefaultscanbeavoidedbyupto about
15 overrideswhichmust be removedafter successful
activation.
Some of the overridesidentifiedas necessaryfor
successfulactivationwere made"permanent".These
had no impacton operationor safetyfunction,and
includedrecirculationloop flowrate high limit and
transienttime for the dometo be evacuatedafter a
startupnitrogenpurgeof thecellstack.
Otheroverridesreducedthehazardcontrolsfor leakage
detectiontemporarilyuntil successfulactivation. The
controlswerethenre-enabledby resettingtheoverrides
afterasuccessfulstartupwasachieved.
PLANS FOR FUTURE SUCCESSFUL ACTIVATIONS
Only one potential issue with the OGS operation while in
Process or Standby has been identified. During an
extended period in Standby, the heated hydrogen outlet
tubing ncreases in temperature due to reduced product
hydrogen cooling flow. The temperature sensor is
downstream of the hydrogen outlet heater, and they are
both between the RSA and a regulator which maintains
pressure against space vacuum. As soon as hydrogen
flow commences the temperature spikes. The highest
temperature seen was 4.3C below the default shutdown
limit, which is based on the derated material limits. This
value wil be monitored, but currently no changes are
planned.
After the end of each OGS Activation, the RSA quantity
has been maximized on commanded Shutdown. Since
the WDS pressure drops as its accumulator quantity
decreases, the RSA fill quantity also decreases At
some point, the RSA quantity increase will be insufficient
for a successful fill. At this point, software will attempt a
second fill in 30 seconds. Therefore, Shutdown is
commanded after a confirmed RSA double fill.
Since the OGS dome is evacuated during extended
shutdowns, measurable diffusion occurs from the OGS
cell stack to space. The time between activations 2 and
3 was 144 days. Activations will be scheduled within
approximately 90 days of the previous to minimize water
loss.
The overrides for successful activation will be as
baselined in the Activation #3 procedure, with the RSA
rotationa speed increased to 1783 RPM. This speed
contributed to success in Activations 1 and 3, and the
procedure, including all overrides, was successfully used
In the future, the RSA quantity may not be maximized
when preparing for extended storage. This may be due
to OGS failures, interface failures, or resource issues. It
may therefore be necessary to fill the RSA from
feedwater sources at the next operation opportunity
using overrides. An overfill may occur during this
process. There are safety and operational concerns with
this process that still need to be addressed. The reason
that the OGS software does not allow an RSA fill until
activation is complete is so that the gaseous composition
within the RSA can be first confirmed to be pure
hydrogen by hydrogen production and venting. RSA fill
quantity is limited by design and software so that
dissolved oxygen in the feedwater cannot create a
combustible mixture within the RSA when evolved.
Investigation into a method of recovering proper RSA
quantity will continue.
HYDROGEN SENSOR ORU PURGE ADAPTER
(HOP.&)
When in operation, the OGS produces oxygen with a
high relative humidity. Heaters in the outlet stream and
in the Hydrogen Sensor ORU prevent condensation from
forming. When the OGS is powered down, the heaters
are shut off, gas flow is restricted and there is a high
potential for condensation to form on the cooling sensor
dies inside the Hydrogen Sensor ORU. Sensor dies
could be damaged if power is applied when water has
collected on the dies. The Hydrogen Sensor ORU Purge
Adaptor (HOPA) was designed and manufactured to
purge moist oxygen from the Hydrogen Sensor ORU
after OGS power-down. This purge prevents
condensation from forming on the sensor dies and
preserves sensor calibration life. The HOPA is made up
of three tools: Evacuation, Inlet and Outlet Tools.
Reference Figures 8-10.
Figure 8: Evacuation Tool
Figure 9: Inlet Tool
Figure 10: Outlet Tool
HOPA PROCEDURE The process to purge the
Hydrogen Sensor ORU is quite simple. After OGS
shutdown, the crew disconnects inlet and outlet quick
disconnects from the Hydrogen Sensor in the OGS.
Then the crew connects the HOPA Outlet and Inlet tools
to the respective outlet and inlet quick disconnects on
Hydrogen Sensor ORU. Reference Figure 11. The
HOPA Evacuation Tool is connected to the Portable
Oxygen Apparatus (PBA) Extension Hose which
provides a source of dry oxygen. The crew "evacuates"
potential contaminants from the PBA lines for five
minutes. Then they disconnect the evacuation tool,
reconnect the PBA line to the inlet tool. and purge the
Hydrogen sensor to remove any humidity. The HOPA
was successfully used by space station crew in October
2007 and March 2008 after the OGS activations.
Figure 11: Hydrogen Sensor installed in OGS
HOPA IMPACT ON CALIBRATED LIFE - Currently, the
OGS is operated approximately every 90 days for about
a one-week period. Continuous operation is not possible
because the Water Recovery System (WRS) is not on-
orbit to supply a continuous source of potable water. The
OGS is only operated when potable water is brought to
the space station via the Shuttle. It is desirable to power
down the OGS when it is not producing oxygen so that
valuable power is not consumed cooling systems are
not taxed, and component life is not wasted on items
such as on the 150 day calibration life of the Hydrogen
Sensor ORU. The calibration life of the Hydrogen
Sensor ORU is determined by total power on-time, so as
long as the Hydrogen Sensor ORU is powered, its
calibration life is being used whether or not the OGS is
producing oxygen. Once the WRS is operational on orbit
the OGS may continuously operate unless maintenance
is required. If shutdown is longer than a predetermined
time, the HOPA wil need to be used to purge humidity
from the Hydrogen Sensor•
As mentioned before, the OGS produces oxygen with
high relative humidity and without the heaters warming
the Hydrogen sensors, condensation would form on the
sensor die. Tests have shown the potential for damage
to energized Hydrogen Sensors. If water is on the
sensor's die, electrolysis may result in physical damage
or may cause the devices to indicate an incorrect level of
Hydrogen. Without the HOPA, the Hydrogen Sensor
could not be un-powered therefore using up sensor
calibration life when operation of the OGS is not
required•
HYDROGEN SENSOR ORU LIFE EXTENSION
The previous Hydrogen Sensor calibration life prior to life
extension testing would have required that the OGS be
shut down every 90 days for removal and replacement of
the sensor (Reference 4). This 90 day life was
established early in the development of the sensor
based on historical testing results. Life extension testing
was initiated due to the strong desire to extend the life
and io conservecrew time and logistics.The life
. extension potential looked positive because a
qualificationHydrogenSensorORU had run for an
extendedperiodof timebeyondthe90 day lifeandall
threesensordiesstayedwithincalibrationlimits.
TwoflightHydrogenSensorsweretestedfor 200days
beyondtheiracceptancetesting(Reference8).Thegoal
of the lifeextensiontestwasto increaselifefrom90 to
180 days.The 200 day test durationwas selected
becauseit wouldallowa 10%marginoverthe180day
goal.
Thetwo HydrogenSensorORUsweresimultaneously
testedfor the 200day duration.EachORUhas three
HydrogenSensors,for atotalofsixsensorsto betested.
Test conditionswere the following; Inlet oxygen
temperatureof 70°Fwitha nominaldewpointof 60°F,
interfacetemperatureof 70°Fwithbackg[oundHydrogen
of 100 Pa. Theseconditionswere selectedto mimic
nominalOGSconditionsforthesensor.
Duringthe 200 daysof testingthe six sensorswere
checkedfor accuracyat 30 day increments.Thiswas
completedby passinga knownamountof Hydrogen
from -300 Pa to -1575 Pa with two additionaldata
pointsin between.The accuracyof the sensorswas
takenattwoseparateconditions.First,at60°Fdewpoint
with oxygen temperatureof 70°F and interface
temperatureof 90°F.Secondly,at 85°Fdewpointwith
oxygentemperatureof 100°Fandinterfacetemperature
of 100°F.Thefirstconditionwasconsideredto beOGS
sensorconditionsof a newcellstackandthesecondto
beOGSsensorconditionswitha cellstackat endof life.
Sensorpass/failcriteriarequiredthesensorreadingto
bewithin+/-180Paofthecalibrationlimit.
TheresultswereasfollowsinTable1:
At the30and60dayintervalsallsensorswerewithin+/-
70Pa.
At the120dayintervalalldataallsensorswerewithin
+/-115Pa.
At the180dayintervalalldataallsensorswerewithin
+/-150Pa.
Table1: HydrogenSensorORUSpecificResults
At the200dayintervalfiveofthesixsensorswerewithin
+/- 180Pacalibrationlimit.Onesensorexceeded the -
180 Pa by 6 Pa. Actual Hydrogen partial pressure was
1194 Pa, the sensor indicated a partial pressure of 1008
Pa. The test was repeated after two more days to verify
readings results were similar with an outage of 5 Pa.
See results of this Hydrogen Sensor ORU (3 sensors) in
Figure 12:
2,3:
-1o
Figure 12: SN 1002 Calibration Check
Even though all s_xsensors were within tolerance after
the 180 calibration check and one just outside tolerance
limits at 200 days, it was decided to be conservative and
extend the 90 day life of the Hydrogen sensor to 150
days.
Typical data for one sensor from the life extension test is
shown in Figure 13:
Figure 13: SN 1003 Channel B (single sensor)
SUMMARY
The ISS Oxygen Generation System was launched in
July 2006 and has successfully undergone three periods
of operation in the period July 2007 and March 2008.
Further evaluation of OGS performance, with periodic
operation, will continue in anticipation of WRS activation
in November 2008. With WRS support, longer runtime
will be achievable.
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